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Abstract
The work in this paper is about to detect and classify jamming attacks in 802.11b wireless networks. The number of
jamming detection and classification techniques has been proposed in the literature. Majority of themmodel
individual parameters like signal strength, carrier sensing time, and packet delivery ratio to detect the presence of a
jammer and to classify the jamming attacks. The demonstrated results by the authors are often overlapping as most of
the jamming regions are closely marked, and they do not help to clearly distinguish different jamming mechanisms.
We investigate a multi-modal scheme that models different jamming attacks by discovering the correlation between
three parameters: packet delivery ratio, signal strength variation, and pulse width of the received signal. Based on that,
profiles are generated in normal scenarios during training sessions which are then compared with test sessions to
detect and classify jamming attacks. Our proposed model helps in clearly differentiating the jammed regions for
various types of jamming attacks. In addition, it is equally effective for both the protocol-aware and protocol-unaware
jammers. The reported results are not based on simulations, but a test-bed was established to experiment real
scenarios demonstrating significant enhancements in previous results reported in the literature.
Keywords: Jamming attacks; Detection and classification; 802.11 wireless networks
1 Introduction
Wireless networks make use of shared transmission
medium; therefore, they are open to several malicious
attacks. An attacker with a radio transceiver intercepts a
transmission, injects spurious packets, and blocks or jams
the legitimate transmission. Jammers disrupt the wireless
communication by generating high-power noise across
the entire bandwidth near the transmitting and receiv-
ing nodes. Since jamming attacks drastically degrade the
performance of wireless networks, some effective mecha-
nisms are required to detect their presence and to avoid
them. Constant, deceptive, reactive, intelligent, and ran-
dom jammers are few jamming techniques used in wire-
less medium. All of them can partially or fully jam the link
at varying level of detection probabilities.
Accurate detection of radio jamming attacks is chal-
lenging in mission critical scenarios. Many detection
techniques have been proposed in the literature, but the
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precision component is always an issue. Some of them
either produce high false alarm rates or do partial detec-
tion of jamming attacks. Moreover, the results are based
on simulations [1-7]. After detection, classification of jam-
ming attacks is necessary to launch appropriate recovery
techniques like channel hopping or spatial retreat. The
classification of jamming attacks plays an important role
not only to differentiate them from each other but also
to identify different network performance degradation
phenomena like network congestion or channel fading.
1.1 Our contribution
As earlier said, the reported work in the literature
mainly focus on the classification of jamming attacks
based on packet delivery ratio (PDR), signal strength
(SS), or carrier sensing time (CST) individually. Accu-
rate detection of jamming attacks based on single detec-
tion parameter is not too accurate [1]. Various models
based on two parameters have been proposed [1,3-5].
The detection of jamming based on PDR in consis-
tence with signal strength and location is discussed in
[1]. Authors in [1] identified jammed and non-jammed
regions, but they did not distinguish different types
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of jamming attacks. In [3], a drop in PDR is checked
by considering the correlation coefficient between error
and correct reception time, but that works for reactive
jammers only. Another technique for detection based
on fabricated clear-to-send (CTS) packets is discussed
in [4]; however, it is more promising to intelligent
jamming.
Authors in [5] observe the deferred transmissions.
When PDR drops, the average number of transmission
attempts per successful transmission is checked. Then,
the decision of jamming or no jamming is taken based
on the predefined threshold values. The PDR in corre-
sponding with signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is checked in
[6], and the presence of a jammer is declared based on
predefined threshold values. Authors also use the net-
work throughput for the given number of nodes with fixed
transmission probability as a detection parameter. The
approach works fine; however, it needs more explanation
for the cases when the SNR is low and the network is
congested.
The jamming detection techniques reported in the lit-
erature are of specific types. Authors have mainly worked
on a particular jamming attack, and therefore, the classifi-
cation of different attacks remained relatively less studied.
The development of multi-modal detection technique can
help in detecting jamming attacks with lower false alarm
rate and high precision. In our work, we propose a three-
dimensional model based on signal strength, PDR, and
pulse width (PW) of the signal resulting in a significant
improvement in accuracy and also to classify jamming
attacks in a better way.
1.2 Outline
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2
provides relevant definitions, terms, and metrics to char-
acterize the jamming attacks. Section 3 provides a brief
summary of previous work done on jamming detection
and classification. In Section 4, we explain our proposed
model for both the detection and classification of jam-
ming attacks. An analysis on the achieved results is pre-
sented in Section 6. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
Section 7.
2 Definitions andmetrics to measure
This section provides definitions of related parameters
and explains types of jamming attacks. It also provides
metrics to characterize jamming attacks.
2.1 Definitions
2.1.1 Packet delivery ratio
It is the ratio of the total number of packets correctly
received to the total number of packets received. For an
environment with noise and interference, the PDR is mea-
sured at the receiver side as the ratio of number of packets
received that pass cyclic redundancy check (CRC) to the
total number of packets received.
2.1.2 Packet sent ratio
Packet sent ratio (PSR) is measured at the transmitter side.
It is the total number of acknowledgments (ACKs) packets
received to the total number of packets transmitted.
2.1.3 Carrier sensing time
It is the time a station has to wait for the channel to get
idle to start its transmission.
2.1.4 Signal strength
It is the signal power that is observed on the receiver end.
Signal strength can be used as a detection parameter [1].
There are two approaches that are used to characterize
the variation in signal strength: (1) average value of signal
strength in time window and (2) spectral discrimination
technique.
2.2 Types of jamming attacks
2.2.1 Constant jammers
A constant jammer continuously produces high-power
noise that represents random bits. The bit generator does
not follow any media access control (MAC) protocol and
operates independent of the channel sensing or traffic on
the channel.
2.2.2 Random jammers
A random jammer operates randomly in both sleep and
jam intervals. During sleep interval, it sleeps irrespective
of any traffic on the network, and during jam interval, it
acts as a constant or reactive jammer. That jammer does
not follow any MAC protocol. The PDR increases when
the sleep interval increases and the packet size decreases.
2.2.3 Deceptive jammers
These jammers continuously send illegitimate packets so
that the channel appears busy to the legitimate nodes.
They are protocol aware and increase carrier sensing
time for the legitimate nodes indefinitely. The difference
between a deceptive and a constant jammer is that a con-
stant jammer sends random bits continuously while a
deceptive jammer sends packets which appear legitimate
to the receiver.
2.2.4 Reactive jammers
A reactive jammer activates when it senses the transmis-
sion on the channel. If the channel is idle, it remains
dormant and keeps sensing the channel. On sensing the
transmission, it transmits enough noise resulting some
sufficient number of bits corrupted in the legitimate
packet so that packet checksum is not recovered by the
receiver and the packet is discarded. Hence, it causes the
drop in PDR.
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2.2.5 Shot noise-based intelligent jammers
Shot noise-based intelligent jammers are protocol-aware
jammers that just beat forward error correction (FEC)
scheme used at physical andMAC layers [8]. IEEE 802.11b
networks use convolutional coding at the physical layer.
Single continuous pulse interfering legitimate packet can
completely drop it if it is able to beat the FEC scheme used
in the packet [7,9].
2.3 Characterizing jamming attacks
A jamming attack can be detected easily, less effective,
energy efficient, or protocol aware. How to characterize a
jamming attack? There are a few commonly used metrics
characterizing the jamming attacks:
• Least detection probability
• Stealthy against detectors
• Completely denial of service like constant jammers
• Protocol aware so that they are less likely to detect
• Authentication of users
• Strength against FEC codes
• Strength at physical layer to beat channel coding
techniques
• Energy conservation is to get highest jamming
efficiency with least energy used
The type of metrics also depends on the application in
consideration. Energy efficiency is an important metric
for all the jammers specifically in jamming the sensor net-
works for a long time. Strong denial of service is critical in
war situations. Least probability of detection is desired for
jammers if they have to keep for a long time in opponent
areas safely. FEC schemes increase resilience of packet
against errors. Strong FEC codes can be compromised
with constant or intelligent jamming.
Similarly, metrics to efficient and accurate detection of
jamming attacks are as follows:
• Low false alarm rate
• Proactive detection
• Least computational cost
• Quick detection
3 Literature review
PDR, PSR, CST, and SS are important measures to detect
jamming attacks. These parameters are influenced by
channel fading, network congestion, or link failure. Afore-
mentioned jamming detection techniques have been dis-
cussed in [1]. Adaptive threshold like in BMAC protocol
is suggested in [1], but it has the drawback of continu-
ously increasing the transmission power, eventually jam-
mer blasting at channel and detector which shows the
channel idle. Two signal strength measurements are taken
into consideration. The basic average for energy detec-
tion fails for a constant jammer. The technique of spectral
discrimination is used which shows that if higher order
crossing is used, then it works for constant and deceptive
jammers but cannot distinguish random and reactive jam-
mers. CST is taken as another measure that is the time a
node has to wait for the channel to start its transmission.
It is observed that under network congestion, the CST is
greater than those of random and reactive jammers.
Another detection strategy using PDR with two consis-
tency checks, i.e., signal strength consistency check and
location consistency check (LCC), is proposed in [1]. If
signal strength is higher, then PDR must be high while
converse is not true. In case of LCC, an assumption is
taken that all nodes in the network have their neighbor-
hood information from their upper routing layer. If a node
observes low PDR, it compares it with that of its neighbor
and decides whether the channel is jammed or not. More-
over, the neighboring nodes have to pass the location and
update messages periodically about their new location.
This is communication overhead. The effectiveness of
methods in [1] is based on the analysis of the large amount
of data collected in all possible scenarios. Thus, they are
not designed as real-time methods. Another disadvan-
tage is that the jamming detection method and counter-
measure are separately considered so that the problems
are simplified, but the network performances are not
optimized.
Detection probability and power usage by different jam-
mers are discussed in [2]. It shows that constant jam-
mers have highest detection probability and highest power
usage while intelligent jammers are best for their least
detection probability and power usage. In [2], an optimal
omniscient jammer is considered that jams ACK using
probabilistic model. Moreover, it takes a pulse width of
22 μs to jam ACK at a rate of 1 Mbps. However, it is
difficult to detect the transmission of ACK due to its
very short length. Statistical correlation, a measurement
between two random variables, is used to detect a jam-
ming attack [3]. In this case, the correlation strongly exists
between error and correct reception time. The threshold
is defined as the maximum value of slope that any cou-
ple of correlation coefficient and error probability (EP)
could have. The relation in this correlation is checked
with certain predefined EP and estimated threshold. If
the relation is within the threshold, then it is considered
non-jammed, or else, it is jammed. However, it works
in case of reactive jammer that activates only when it
senses activity on wireless medium. Fabricated CTS spec-
ifying certain amount of network allocation vector (NAV)
duration time to jam the wireless channel has been dis-
cussed in [4]. In this way, the malicious node forces
its neighbors to keep quiet as long as specified in CTS
packet’s NAV duration field. It investigates the adverse
effects of such attacks on channel throughput and deliv-
ery ratio and proposes a simple method called address
Sufyan et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking 2013, 2013:208 Page 4 of 18
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2013/1/208
inspection scheme that uses two-hop neighborhood infor-
mation. The main idea is to compare the destination
field on the CTS frame with the neighborhood informa-
tion. The targeted node sends a clear reservation (CR)
message back to all neighbors, and all nodes reset their
values to previous NAV values. However, it uses two-hop
neighborhood information that all nodes must maintain
using periodic ‘HELLO’ messages so that the freshness
of information could be maintained. Also, the node get-
ting the fabricated CTS message with its ID as targeting
address sends back a CR message. Hence, there is a com-
munication overhead in this technique. This technique
also suffers from partial detection of a jamming attack,
a portion of the network remains jammed, and other
recovers from a jamming attack and works perfectly. Cell
breathing is a new detection and recovery technique dis-
cussed in [5] not only for the case of jammers but also
for normal network operations to increase the network
throughput. This approach works for constant jammer
detection only and not for protocol-aware jammers. It
is based on the number of frames transmitted per total
attempts of transmission. If the transmission attempts
are above a predefined threshold, the node is consid-
ered jammed. After jammer detection, cell breathing is
used to increase or decrease the transmission power of
the access point so that the jammer may be kept away
from the range of the access point. This not only helps in
mitigating the jamming attack but also load balance the
network throughput. Since the technique used in [1] sug-
gests collection of large amount of data before analysis, [6]
proposed a model-based jamming detection technique for
wireless networks. Without prior knowledge of the net-
work status, a head station can detect a jamming attack
based on PDR observed for a certain value of SNR. How-
ever, it is hard to tell whether the drop in PDR is due
to network congestion or high SNR value. It then sug-
gested the network throughput as a measure of jamming
detection. It shows that for the given values of SNR and
probability of successful transmission, the rate of change
of the network throughput first increases with the num-
ber of nodes in the network and reaches a peak value and
then drops almost like a straight line. It used expected and
observed throughput with marginal threshold values to
detect jamming. However, this marginal threshold varies
with network environments. Once the attack is detected,
it uses a self-healing approach based on runtime channel
allocation algorithm to dynamically assign the most opti-
mal second channel with a best switching probability that
minimizes transient time to stable state. However, this
will work only for wide-band jammers where the num-
ber of channels with reasonable frequency separation is
available. The idea of shot noise-based protocol-aware
intelligent jamming that is presented in [9] is claimed to
be the most energy efficient and with lesser probability
of detection. In this technique, the jammer captures the
NAV value of packet and hence transmission length. Dur-
ing the packet transmission, jammer sends a high-power
pulse with enough width that corrupts enough bits so that
FEC would be exhausted, checksum would not be passed
at MAC layer and the packet drops ultimately. Since the
sender would not get the ACK so it will retransmit the
packet. In [10], the PDR is considered as the detection
parameter and showed that PDR is 78% under normal net-
work operation. However, effects of channel fading, poor
link, and network congestion could be other causes of
drop in PDR.
4 The proposed systemmodel
Our proposed model of RF jamming detects the presence
of the jammers and also to classify them. The model is
based on multi-modal approach that incorporates PDR
and signal strength as the detection parameters. The PDR
is computed over the given sample window of time. Sig-
nal strength variation (S) and PW are the model-specific
parameters. Signal strength variation (S) is the change
in signal strength taken in dB, i.e., (S) = SSobserved -
SSnetwork, where SSnetwork is the signal strength achieved
during training session without jamming and SSobserved
is the signal strength observed when the network is sus-
pected to be under attack. PW is the measure of time for
which (S) is greater than the threshold value, and it is
taken in microseconds.
The jamming pulse acts as high-power Gaussian noise
which can appear several times over the channel. To com-
pute, N samples of channel’s received energy s (t) are
collected. The collected samples thus form a bigger win-
dow of samples s (k), s (k - 1),.....,s (k - N + 1), taken at
consecutive smaller sampling time windows.





T(k) is the average jamming pulse observed for window
of N samples. To decide the presence of a jammer, T(k)
is compared with some threshold γ . The threshold γ is
carefully computed to avoid false detection.
The following are the relevant parameters collected by
the detector in a given sample window of time to detect
the jamming attack and its type: (1) PDR, (2) NAV value
Table 1 IEEE 802.11b data rates and threshold time
Data rate Bits per Transmission Threshold
(Mbps) symbol time (μs) time (μs)
2 2 1 2
5.5 4 0.727 1.454
11 8 0.727 1.454
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Figure 1 State transition diagram for two-state random jammer.
of each packet transmission, (3) S, and (4) pulse width
subject to S > 0.
4.1 Computing data rate
Each packet on physical layer is composed of transmis-
sion symbols. These transmission symbols are composed
of bits. The transmission time of each symbol is depen-
dent on data transmission rate. Hence, we first compute
the data rate and subsequently the transmission time of
each symbol. This computation is particularly of interest
to intelligent jammers.
The data rate (DR) can be computed through the NAV
value of each packet as shown in Table 1. The NAV value
of each packet determines the transmission time of the
packet which is there in the packet header. The data rate




11 Mbps, ∀ NAV ≤ 1, 700 μs.
5.5 Mbps, ∀ 1, 899 μs ≤ NAV ≤ 3, 400 μs.
2 Mbps, ∀ NAV ≥ 9, 000 μs
(2)
The above derivations are valid for a MAC frame with
the size of 2,312 bytes [9]. NAV value varies based on the
packet size and the data transmission rate.
The PDR of the given sampling window can be com-
puted as follows:
PDR = (1 − Pj)(1 − Pc), (3)
where Pj is the jamming probability computed for the dif-
ferent jammers in the subsequent sections and Pc is the
collision probability of the packets when there are many
transmitting nodes at the same time. Since, in our exper-
iments, single transmitter and receiver are involved, Pc is
always zero. However, it comes into consideration when
the number of contending stations for the channel is more
than one [11].
The jamming rate is the rate the jammer jams the chan-
nel. If x is the time for which S > 0 and y is the total
sampling window time, then, it is written as follows:
Rj = xy , (4)
where Rj is the jamming rate. For example, if jamming
pulse lasts for 1 μs in a total window of 1,000 μs, Rj is said
to be 1/1,000. For a constant jammer, because of continu-
ous transmission of jamming pulse, the rate is 1. Jamming







where PW is the jammer pulse time and (PWi+1−PWi) is
the sub-window time during which S > 0. T is the total
sample window time.
4.2 Computing jamming probability
Jammers are classified into two major classes: channel
aware and channel unaware. (1) Channel-aware jammers
continuously sense the channel and send jamming pulses
when the packet is transmitted. (2) Channel-unaware jam-
mers do not sense the channel before sending the jamming
pulse and independently jam the channel irrespective of
the transmission or not on channel. Tomodel the behavior
of both types of jammers, we take assumptions that the (1)
transmitter is operating in saturated mode and the chan-
nel always have a packet on it. (2) For any PW of jammer,
S > γ for the pulse duration, where γ is the threshold
defined in Equation 1.
Table 2 Summary of PDR,S, and pulse width
Number PW (μs) Sleep interval (μs) PDR Jammer type Data rate (Mbps)
1 1,000 1 0 Constant Any
2 4,100 ± σ SIc 0 Reactive 2
3 1,500 ± σ SIc 0 Reactive 5.5
4 900 ± σ SIc 0 Reactive 11
5 ≤7 n/a <5 Intelligent 2 to 11
6 500 ± σ 500 ± σ 45 Random 2
7 500 ± σ 500 ± σ 25 Random 5.5
8 500 ± σ 500 ± σ 12 Random 11
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Figure 2 Detection of constant jamming attack.
4.2.1 Jamming probability of protocol-aware jammer
For protocol-aware jammers, the probability P of a packet
to be jammed is conditioned on the fact that a packet
is transmitting say denoted as transmission time of the
packet (TPKT) and then the jamming pulse for the dura-
tion of PW strikes the channel:
P(PW|TPKT) = P(PW ∩ TPKT)P(TPKT) (6)
Each packet is composed of transmission symbols. The
data bits in each symbol depend on the data rate. The


































Figure 3 Detection of reactive jamming attack.
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Figure 4 Detection of shot noise jamming attack.



























Figure 5 Detection of random jamming attack (2 Mbps).
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Figure 6 Detection of random jamming attack (5.5 Mbps).



























Figure 7 Detection of random jamming attack (11 Mbps).
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Figure 8 Detection and classification of four jamming attacks.
transmission time of each symbol, Tsymbol, is computed as
follows:
Tsymbol = NbDR, (7)
where Nb is the number of data bits in each symbol and
DR is data rate at which it is transmitted.
IEEE 802.11b does not use any FEC at the physical layer
except channel codes (Barker and complementary code
keying). It means that destroying one complete symbol
will destroy the whole packet. Ideally, the threshold time
(TH) for the jamming pulse required to destroy a packet
is as follows:
TH = (2 × Tsymbol) + GI (8)
where GI is the guard interval in two consecutive symbols.
Guard interval is necessary to avoid intersymbol interfer-
ence in two symbols. It is caused when symbols arrive at
the receiver from two different paths. Multiplication with
2 is to ensure that TH should be enough to completely
overlap the symbol in air.
The duration of jamming pulse is different for different
types of protocol-aware jammers. For the typical reactive
jammer, the jammer PW is equal to the TPKT, i.e., jam-
ming pulse lasts for the whole time of packet transmission.
Whereas, for shot noise-based jammers, PW is greater
than or equal to the TH as defined in Equation 9:
TPKT ≥ PW ≥ TH (9)
The difference in reactive and shot noise-based intelli-
gent jammers is the PW. The shot noise-based jammers
intelligently hit enough part of the transmission (data
or ACK) such that the FEC scheme in the packet fails
to recover the packet at the receiver side. Hence, with
relatively lesser detection probability and higher energy
efficiency, same jamming efficiency is achieved as that of
the reactive jammer.
Table 3 IEEE 802.11b channel coding at physical layer
Data rate Code length Modulation Modulation rate Symbol rate (Msps) Bits per symbol
1 Mbps 11-Barker DBPSK 11,000,000 1 1
2 Mbps 11-Barker DQPSK 11,000,000 1 2
5.5 Mbps 8-CCK DQPSK 11,000,000 1.375 4
11 Mbps 8-CCK DQPSK 11,000,000 1.375 8
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Table 4 Standard deviation between different jammers
Jammer Constant Random Reactive Intelligent
512.98 239.66 2118.71 2.52
Constant 512.98 316.67 2,072.98 212.32
Random 497.48 239.66 2,084 105.63
Reactive 92.17 1,134 2,113.61 879.41
Shot noise 509.27 240.61 2,104.52 2.49
The jamming probability of the protocol-aware jammers










0, PW ≤ TH
1, PW > TH
(11)
where K is the number of effected packets and N is the
total number of packets in the sampling window.
4.2.2 Jamming probability of protocol-unaware jammers
The following are the jamming probability of protocol-
unaware jammers:
• Constant jammer: the jamming probability of
constant jammer is one. This is because the fact that
it continuously transmits random bits during the
whole observation window, and the channel appears
always busy to legitimate nodes for transmission.
• Random jammer: random jammers jam the channel
independent of sleep and jam intervals of the
transmission during a time window and behave
exactly as constant jammer if sleep interval is zero
during the time window. Consider a random jammer
that acts as two-state continuous time Markov chain
process as shown in Figure 1. It sleeps with
exponential amount of time with mean 1
λ
, where λ is
the sleeping rate and jams the exponential amount of
time with mean 1
μ
, where μ is the jamming rate. The
jammer jams and sleeps iteratively. Consider that the
jammer is jamming initially at t = 0, what is the
steady state probability that the jammer will be
jamming or sleeping at time t?
Where,
State 1: jam state, MTTJ (mean time to jam) = 1/μ
State 0: sleep state, MTTS (mean time to sleep)=
1/λ
For random jammer operating in the steady state, the
global balance equations for both states are as follows:
λπ1 = μπ0 (12)
μπ0 = λπ1 (13)
where π0 and π1 are the proportions of time the jammer
spends in state {0,1}. Since both values in Equations 12
and 13 are unknown, from the normalization condition,
we know that,
π0 + π1 = 1 (14)
Putting the value of π0 = (λ/μ)π1, from Equation 12 to
Equation 14 results,
π1 = μ
μ + λ (15)
and,
π0 = λ
μ + λ (16)
Equations 15 and 16 provide a steady state probability
for sleep and jam state.
Transient availability of each state is the rate of buildup
for each state. Considering state 1, rate of buildup = rate
of flow in − rate of flow out:
π ′1(t) = μπ0(t) − λπ1(t) (17)
π ′1(t) = μ − (λ − μ)π1(t) (18)
Table 5 Random jammer estimated PDR variation frommean
Data rate Rate (j, s) Mean PDR Maximum deviated PDR Maximum estimated deviation(%)
2 Mbps (500, 100) 12.11 12.5 1.02
2 Mbps (500, 500) 45.27 42.92 5.199
2 Mbps (500, 1,000) 55.99 53.71 4.89
5.5 Mbps (500, 100) 15.16 15.28 0.75
5.5 Mbps (500, 500) 22.88 25.15 10.25
5.5 Mbps (500, 1,000) 32.45 35.48 9.34
11 Mbps (500, 100) 8.20 8.29 1.09
11 Mbps (500, 500) 13.0 11.96 8.01
11 Mbps (500, 1,000) 18.57 16.88 9.10
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Table 6 No transmission, only jammer and detector
Number Jammer Distance (m) Baseline S (dB)
power (dB) power (dB)
1 -18 1 -46 28
2 -22 1.5 -43 21
3 -24 2 -39 15
Since π1(0) = 1 and further solving Equation 18 yields
the following [12]:
π1(t) = μ
μ + λ +
λ




μ + λ +
μ
μ + λ exp
−(μ+λ)t (20)
Equations 19 and 20 give transient probability for jam
and sleep state, respectively, at time t. However, for
the system to be in steady state, for large value of t,




μ + λ (21)
That is equivalent to Equation 15. Equations 15 and 16
give the probability of random jammer to remain in any of
the two states.
4.3 Classification of jamming attacks
Identifying the type of jamming attacks is necessary to
take appropriate recovery technique. For two stations in
network, single transmitter and receiver, collision proba-
bility Pc = 0 and Equation 3 is reduced to:
PDR = (1 − Pj) (22)
where Pj is the jamming probability computed for differ-
ent jammers. The value of Pj for constant jammer is always
one; PDR is always observed to be zero. The jamming
probability for intelligent and reactive jammers is com-
puted in Equation 10. For the random jammer that jams
and sleeps for exponential amount of time, Equation 15
computes the steady state jamming probability.
The types of jamming attacks are classified based on
PDR and PW. Equation 23 acts as a classification equation




= 0, PW = TH, ⇒ Shot noise jammer
= 0, PW = TPKT, ⇒ Reactive jammer
= 0, PW = Twin, ⇒ Constant jammer
≥ 0, PW = X ± σ , ⇒ Random jammer
(23)
where Twin is the time of whole sampling window, X is the
mean jamming pulse width observed for random jammer
and σ is the threshold value around it.
Figure 9 Signal strength variation at 1 m.
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Figure 10 Signal strength variation at 1.5m.
Figure 11 Signal strength variation at 2 m.
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Table 7 Legitimate transmission, jammer and detector
Number Jammer Distance (m) Baseline S (dB)
power (dB) power (dB)
1 -17 1 -35 18
2 -23 1.5 -33 10
3 -24 2 -32 8
It is important to note that the selection of σ is a bit
tricky, and it is dependent on the network. For example,
in our experiments, we find that the drop in the PDR
caused by the random jammer is 5.199% when the jammer
is operating with Ts and Tj as [500,500] μs each at the DR
of 2 Mbps. Therefore, we chose σ as 6%.
5 Experimental setup
We build a test bed for four jammers that are constant,
random, reactive, and intelligent. The purpose of this pro-
totype is to validate our analytical results with real-world
experimental results. The test bed is based on Univer-
sal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) and GNU Radio
for jammer and detector [13]. Four types of jammers are
implemented on USRP. We observed the influence on
PDR at detector under different jamming scenarios with
different jamming parameters (PW, S).
5.1 Setup
Our experimental setup consists of four nodes: one as
transmitter, one as receiver, one as jammer, and one
as detector. The transmitter and receiver are connected
via D-Link 2.4 GHz wireless router dl-514 (D-Link,
London, England) with infrastructure mode. Both nodes
are equipped with dwl-650 PCMCIA wireless cards (D-
Link) that can operate on all four data rates of 802.11b.
Both nodes have Fedora 12.86 (Raleigh, NC, USA) as the
operating system with kernel 2.6. It automatically detects
the wireless card driver. Installation and working of dwl-
650 drivers can be seen at [14]. The traffic between two
machines is generated using PING utility with zero inter-
packet interval, and the size of each packet is kept as 1,024
bytes.
Both the jammer and detector use Fedora 12.86 oper-
ating system and implements GNURadio-3.2.4 and USRP.
The USRP kit has RFX-2400 daughter boards of range
2,400 to 2,500 MHz and VERT-2450 vertical antenna
(Ettus, Mountain View, CA, USA). The jamming models
have been written in Python, Beaverton, USA. The detec-
tor machine has wireshark and a packet capture tool
installed on it.
Experiments are performedwith different placements of
all the four nodes. However, due to space constraints, all
the nodes are placed in a circle of 1.5-m radius by plac-
ing the wireless router at the center of the circle and all
other nodes at the circumference of the circle. The jam-
ming node is preferred to be kept near the receiver to
affect PDR.
Ideal channel conditions are achieved by scanning the
channel one by one for some time and pick up the one
that is least affected from interference. Jamming pulse has
the power ranging from 15 to 19 dB enough higher than
the normal transmission. It is sufficient to corrupt the
ongoing transmission.
5.2 Algorithm
Algorithm 1 explains the detection sequence. The text for
the conditional statements is kept italic, and the remain-
ing algorithm is in regular text format. The PDR of a
node is obtained using the method MeasurePDR(). It
is then compared with the predefined threshold value
threshPDR. If PDR is lower than the threshold value,
then the current signal strength variation S is com-
pared with signal strength variation S in the nor-
mal network. Next is to check the PDR in consistence
with S using CheckPDRnSSvariation totalPDR, S.
If it is found true that the symbol transmission time
is obtained through GetSymbolTransmissionTime(), the
packet transmission time is obtained through GetPack-
etTransmissionTime(packetLength) and the pulse width
using GetObservedPulseWidth() methods. The obtained
PW is then compared with its predefined values for con-
stant, random, reactive, and protocol-aware intelligent
jammers.
The pseudocode of Algorithm 1 suggests that there are
n statements. So the time complexity of the proposed
algorithm is O(n).
5.3 Training the detector
In this phase, we train the detector for different jamming
scenarios. The transmitter sends the legitimate packets to
the receiver. The jammer jams it depending on the jam-
ming technique being employed at that time. The receiver,
on the other end, captures the packets. That process is
Table 8 No transmission, no jammer
Number Time (s) Distance (m) Baseline power (dB) S (dB) Power
fluctuations
Pulse width (μs)
1 80 1 -46 4 97 127
2 80 1.5 -43 2 91 123
3 80 2 -39 1 93 126
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Algorithm 1: Jammer detection and classification
algorithm
Input: totalPDR(N) = MeasurePDR() : N ∈ Neighbors
Output: Jammer Type Alert
if (totalPDR ≤ threshPDR) then
S = SampleSignalStrength() -
NormalSignalStrength()
PDRSSV = CheckPDRSSVariation(totalPDR,S)








if (PW ≤ 2 * symbolTT) then
Post ProtocolAwareIntelligentjammed()
end
else if (PW == packetTT) then
Post ReactiveJammed()
end
else if (PW == ConstantJammed()) then
Post ConstantJamming()
end
else if (PW == RandomPulse()) then
sleepInterval = GetSleepInterval()
if (sleepInterval > packetTT) then







repeated for 120 s for each jammer. During this time, the
set of the entire packet influenced through jamming is
created. Meanwhile, the detector measures the variation
in signal strength (S) and also the PW. Based on the
proposed multi-modal scheme, the area of occurrence of
these parameters is determined for each type of jammer.
Each detection area represents a type of jamming attack.
This analogy helps in the detection of a jamming attack
and classification.
The PDR of each session is measured using Wireshark
that acts as a packet capturing tool to capture packets
received at the network interface. The CRC of the packet
is checked on reception, and the packets with bad CRC
are listed and dropped. PDR is then measured as the num-
ber of packets is correctly received to the total number
of packets received. The impact of signal strength vari-
ation (S) is discussed in Section 5.3. PW is dependent
on the signal strength variation. Since the transmission
power varies because of power fluctuations and external
interference (Wi-Fi access point), signal strength varia-
tion threshold γ needs to be set. γ also depends on the
distance between the jammer and the detector, transmis-
sion power of the transmitter, and the amount of external
interference.
Since pulse width is taken for signal strength vari-
ation above a predefined threshold γ at defined dis-
tance, the drop in PDR can be estimated. To validate
the above argument, experiments are done for various
jamming scenarios and the corresponding results are
collected.
6 Analysis and results
We carried out multiple sessions for each type of jammer
described in Section 2.2. As shown in Table 2, we mea-
sure the (1) PW for different types of jammers, (2) impact
on PDR, and (3) variation in signal strength (S) that is
under normal and jammed scenarios by keeping the size
of the packets as 1,024 bytes. For a given jammer type,
each jamming session lasts for 120 s and the frequency is
2,450 MHz. The session is repeated for five times, and the
average value is taken.
SIc is the sleep interval of channel, and σ is the variation
in pulse width observed.
6.1 Results
Figures 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 individually describes four jam-
mers, and Figure 8 classifies four types of jammers and
indicates the area where the type of jammer lies. In these
figures, empirically gathered experimental results taken
from test bed validate analytical counterparts. Figure 4
shows shot noise-based intelligent jammers where the TH
is experienced lesser than that of our results. The reason
for the increase in pulse width is channel coding robust-
ness provided at different data rates. Another reason is
the experienced throughput provided by commercial IEEE
802.11b wireless cards [15]. The actual throughput expe-
rienced is around one-half of the one provided by the
vendor. This is the reason of providing almost double
jamming pulse to completely jam the packet.
Figure 5 indicates that high jamming efficiency can be
achieved with very small jamming rate, i.e., almost zero
PDR for different pulse widths.
It is to be noted that 802.11b does not have any FEC
scheme at the physical layer [16]. However, it uses dif-
ferent channel coding schemes for different data rates as
shown in Table 3.
The physical layer of 802.11b is quite robust against
interference due to direct sequence spread spectrum
(DSSS) and channel coding techniques like Barker
sequence for 1 and 2 Mbps and complementary code
keying (CCK) for 5.5 and 11 Mbps, still some packets
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Figure 12 Pulse width monitoring during training session.
with bad bytes pass to MAC layer. Since these packets
cannot pass CRC check, hence these are discarded. It
can also be inferred that the probability of packet drop
increases/decreases with data rate, modulation [17], and
coding techniques the transmission is using. It is also
worthmentioning here that DSSS is relatively more robust
than CCK because of 11 chips per bit that are spread
on 22 MHz band. CCK uses 4 bits/8chips for 5.5 Mbps
and 8 bits/8 chips for 11 Mbps. However, autocorrelation
properties of CCK make it robust [18].
The standard deviation of ten experimental values of
pulse width and PDR is given in the first row of Table 4.
Subsequent rows provide variation in the standard devi-
ation for the mean value of pulse width and PDR for the
given jammer at a data rate of 2 Mbps.
Table 4 indicates the variation in the standard deviation.
It is observed that the standard deviation of all four jam-
mers differs significantly as indicated by the first row of
Table 4. The impact on standard deviation for different
jammers is shown in row 2 to row 5. It is computed if the
mean value of pulse width and PDR for any other jam-
mer under consideration is provided. It is observed that
the first two columns of the last row do not show signif-
icant variation from the standard deviation value of con-
stant and random jammers, respectively. Here, the pulse
width of the different jammers is used as a classification
parameter.
Reasonable estimates of PDR variation are required for
random jammers. We developed a random jammer that
operates in jam and sleep intervals iteratively. Jam and
sleep rates follow exponential distribution and generate
pseudorandom numbers around given jam and sleep rate.
Table 5 indicates the maximum PDR variation from the
mean value for the given (jam, sleep) rate at a specific data
rate.
6.2 Assessment of false detections and signal strength
variation
It is important to characterize the signal strength variation
and false detections for accuracy assessment. The term
baseline power is the power that the detector observes
when no jamming activity on the channel is under obser-
vation. This is the power observed when there is no
transmission or transmission on the channel. Different
Table 9 Microwave oven and detector, no jammer
Number Distance (m) Frequency (MHz) External noise (dB) Baseline power (dB) S(dB)
1 1 2,450 -30 -46 16
2 1.5 2,450 -35 -46 11
3 2 2,450 -38 -46 8
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Figure 13 The spectral changes in the presence of high power external interference.
scenarios with multiple parameters are created to charac-
terize S and impact of distance.
6.2.1 No transmission, only jammer and detector
The experiment is done with single jammer and detector
in the scenario. The distance in the jammer and detector
varies from 1 to 2 m. The impact on signal strength is
shown in Table 6.
The impact on signal strength variation with distance
can be seen from Figures 9, 10, and 11.
6.2.2 Legitimate transmission and jammer
The experiment is performed with one legitimate packet
generator connected to the access point. The jammer and
detector are placed at a distance changing from 1 to 2 m.
The results are shown in Table 7.
It is important to observe in Table 7 that the baseline
power alleviated from -35 to -32 dB for the distance of
1 to 2 m, respectively. The baseline power is actually the
transmission power observed at the channel. Hence, S
reduces from 18 to 8 dB as the distance increases from
1 to 2 m. This indicates careful selection of threshold γ
to differentiate jamming from false detection for variable
distance.
6.2.3 No transmission, no jammer
In this scenario, only the detector machine is active. It
is created to observe the average number of power fluc-
tuations and external interferences in a given window of
time. The average pulse width time for fluctuations is also
observed. The results are shown in Table 8.
Figure 12 shows the pulse width spectrum. It is taken at
the detector machine during point-to-point transmission
session.
Table 8 shows that PW, because unintentional exter-
nal interference, is enough to drop an 802.11b packet at
supported data rates. It is important that S is small.
Many commercial wireless NICs have adaptive transmis-
sion power and treat such S as noise.
6.2.4 High-power external interference
It is important to characterize the intentional jamming
attack from unintentional high-power noise interference.
To produce external interference, a microwave oven
Table 10 Microwave oven, detector and jammer
Number Distance (m) Frequency (MHz) External noise (dB) Baseline power (dB) S(dB)
1 1 2450 -29 -46 17
2 1.5 2450 -26 -46 20
3 2 2450 -25 -46 21
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Table 11 False detection rate for random jammer
Data rate Rate (j, s) Mean PDR Observed PDR Noise active time (s) False detections (%)
2 Mbps (500, 100) 12.5 10 10 1.66
2 Mbps (500, 500) 45.27 41 10 4.5
2 Mbps (500, 1,000) 55 45 10 5.1
5.5 Mbps (500, 100) 15 11.28 10 1.83
5.5 Mbps (500, 500) 22.88 16 10 5.3
5.5 Mbps (500, 1,000) 32.45 21 10 5.92
11 Mbps (500, 100) 8.20 5.87 10 2.1
11 Mbps (500, 500) 12.63 8.1 10 5.43
11 Mbps (500, 1,000) 18.57 10.9 10 6.62
operating at 2,450 MHz is used. The oven is operated
for 10 s during each monitoring session. Table 9 shows
the spectrum change results when no jammer activates,
and Figure 13 shows the spectral changes. Table 10
demonstrates the statistical results in the presence of a
jammer.
S in Table 9 is found to be close toS due to a jammer
in a given scenario. Since the external noise source acts as
a constant jammer during activation time, it is difficult to
classify the drop in PDR due to the constant jammer or
external noise source. For random jammers, false detec-
tions are shown from Figures 5, 6, and 7. The impact
of high-power external noise on PDR of random jammer
is shown in Table 11. It is evident that false detection
rate increases with an increase in the high-power external
noise operating at a distance for which S ≤ γ .
7 Conclusion
The major contribution of the work is the classification
of jamming attacks with accuracy and low false alarm
rate. Instead of performing simulations, a real test bed is
developed for launching different jamming attacks with
software-defined radio on USRP. Similarly, the detector
node equipped with USRP and Python scripts collected
the readings. The experimental results are cross veri-
fied with analytical results. This multi-modal detection
scheme not only enhanced the accuracy of detection but
also provided the classification of jamming attacks. It
takes into account that PDR, signal strength variation, and
pulse width yield results that comply with experimental
results.
The proposed mathematical model is an attempt
towards solid foundation for the classification of jamming
attacks. Moreover, the experiments are done with single
transmitter and receiver. It is extensible for more than two
nodes to monitor the PDR and signal strength variation
of transmitting nodes. Signal strength variation becomes
complex when more than two transmitting nodes and a
jammer are present on the channel. To study the change
of power levels in the presence of multiple stations and
jammers, there could be another dimension for study.
Another aspect is to mathematically model the collision
probability and extend the equations that compute PDR.
IEEE 802.11 g/n are not addressed in this paper. However,
this work can be extended for these protocols.
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